This paper presents a new attack called Decimation Attack of most stream ciphers. It exploits the property that multiple clocking (or equivalently d-th decimation) of a LFSR can simulate the behavior of many other LFSRs of possible shorter length. It yields then signi cant improvements of all the previous known correlation and fast correlation attacks. A new criterion on the length of the polynomial is then de ned to resist to the decimation attack. Simulation results and complexity comparison are detailed for ciphertext only attacks.
Introduction
Despite growing importance of block ciphers, stream ciphers remain a very important class of cipher systems mainly used by governmental world.
In a binary additive stream cipher, the ciphertext is obtained by bitwise addition of the plaintext to a pseudo-random sequence called the running key. This latter is produced by a pseudo-random generator whose initial state constitutes the secret key. Most real-life designs center around Linear Feedback Shift-Register (LFSR) combined by a nonlinear Boolean function. Di erent variant exist: clock-controlled systems, lter generators, multiplexed systems, memory combiners, decimated generators,... This paper will focus on the most common class of combination generators depicted in Figure 1 .
The cryptanalyst's problem often deals with that of recovering the initial states of some LFSRs, assuming that the structure of the generator is known to him.State of the art in generic stream ciphers cryptanalysis can be summarized correlation order k thus imposing on the cryptanalyst to consider simultaneously several LFSRs 6] . In this case it is obvious that the k distinct LFSRs can be seen as a unique LFSR of length L; the length and the feedback polynomial P of this LFSR can be derived from the feedback polynomials of the constituent polynomials 17]. In the following we will generalize by speaking of the unique target LFSR of length L. A single LFSR will then be a particular case for k = 1.
In correlation attacks 18, 19] 
Most applications use a primitive feedback polynomial to ensure that the periods of all sequences produced by the LFSR are maximal. 
Decimation of LFSR sequences
Let us consider a sequence = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; produced by a LFSR of length L whose feedback polynomial is irreducible in GF(q) X]. Suppose now that we operate a sampling on at intervals of d clock cycles (d-fold clocking) thus producing a subsequence = 1 ; 2 ; : : : . In other words, it is equivalent to the d-decimation of the original sequence . Thus we have i = dj for j = 0; 1; 2; : : : or in sequence notation = d].
With d-fold clocking, the original LFSR will behave like a di erent LFSR which is called the simulated LFSR 16] . The interesting question is to determine its properties, especially relatively to the original LFSR. They are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In real case applications, P(x) is primitive so T = 2 L ? 1. Thus when T is not prime, by a careful choice of d such that gcd(2 L ? 1; d) 6 = 1 one may expect to obtain a simulated LFSR shorter than the original one.
Example 1 Let us consider the original LFSR with P(x) = X 4 + X + 1. d 2 C 3 = f3; 6; 9; 12g; T = 5 and L = 4 since the multiplicative order of 2 in Z 5 is 4. d 2 C 5 = f5; 10g; T = 3 and L = 2 since the multiplicative order of 2 in Z 3 is 2 (and P (x) = X 2 + X + 1).
The feedback polynomial P (x) of the simulated LFSR can be obtained by applying the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR synthesis algorithm 11] to the sequence .
Boolean functions for stream ciphers
A Boolean function with n variables is a function from the set of n-bit words, Any kept L -bit candidate is used to generate L bits of the decimated sequence x d]. Since each bit of sequence x d] is a bit of sequence x as well, it can be described by two di erent equations. One has L variables (the bit is seen as a bit of sequence x d]). The other has L variables (the bit is seen as a bit of sequence x). Example 2 illustrates that.
The system of equations in L variables has obviously rank L . Then by taking L principal variables, we can express them (gaussian elimination on the principal subsystem) depending on the L other variables taken as parameters. An additional L -bit exhaustive search on these parameters allows to retrieve the correct L-bit initialization.
Note that in all our experiments, the correct L -bit initialization of the simulated LFSR was always detected with the best or second best estimator value ( rst or second rank, see farther), thus insuring detection and limiting cost of additional exhaustive search. However, to prevent a non such optimal detection, rst step of L -bit exhaustive search is conducted on a few shifted 
Simulation Results
Now let us present simulation results of our attack.
Example 2 Note that rank of the system in L variables is 56, thus with 17 parameters.
Then the additional exhaustive search is on 17 bits and is negligible compared to the rst exhaustive search step.
Decimation Attack Resistance Criterion
By direct use of Proposition 1, we can de ne the following criterion for Decimation Attack resistance. When designing a stream cipher system, one must carefully check the degree of the chosen feedback polynomials (in connection with correlation order) to resist the Decimation Attack. Table 1 gives some values of L satisfying this new resistance criterion ("prime" relates to Corollary 1 and "order" relates to Proposition 3). Canteaut and Trabbia (CT) in 2] recently obtained the best known attack on stream ciphers. They considered parity-check equations of weight = 4; 5 with Gallager iterative decoding. However, the main drawback of their approach, despite its relative e ciency, remains the huge amount of required memory both for preprocessing (generation of the parity-check equations) and decoding steps. This latter, though being the best, still requires higher complexity than suitable for frequent key recovering. We now give here comparison of our attack (DA)(when possible, see where is the weight of the parity-check equation ( Table 2: Comparaison on Example 2 we have a complexity gain of 2 39 with no memory requirement. However CT attack still presents advantages in terms of ciphertext length only for relatively short LFSRs. This is no longer the case as soon as L increases as we can see it for Example 3 ("ppm" means preprocessing with memory and "ppwm" means preprocessing without memory).
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